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As the supposed victory of liberal global capitalism becomes more widely 
accepted, the religious (re)turn to modernity’s secular world deconstructs the 
haphazardly constructed walls that divide the religious from the secular.  While 
postmodern theology exemplifies those attempts at operating within the postsecu-
lar logic, it is decidedly apolitical, bordering on conservatism.  Clayton Crockett’s 
Radical Political Theology represents a sophisticated radical theology with the ambi-
tious goal of decentering establishment theology while maintaining an explicitly 
political focus.  Indeed, at its most fundamental level, Crockett’s theopolitical 
project exists as a union of opposites that exhibits rewarding uses of post-Marxism, 
postmodernism, postliberalism, and postsecularism.
With the rise of the Religious Right in America and what Naomi Klein calls 
“disaster capitalism” over the last three decades, many thinkers appear to be lost 
in the liberal-conservative binary while also stuck relying on pre-modern values 
in order to counterpose today’s ruling regimes (3).  Responding to this climate, 
Crockett proposes to “sketch out a constructive theology that is neither liberal 
in a classic sense nor conservative or orthodox in any way, whether politically or 
theologically” (2). This will demand a radical theology, which finds its roots in the 
American academy’s tradition of the death of God and postmodern theologies, as a 
counterweight to the Religious Right’s conservative Christianity, while also pursu-
ing radical political commitments.  Crockett explicates the focus of such theopo-
litical commitments by “suggesting that the political and the theological problem 
of our time is that of freedom... Radical theology’s task is to think freedom, which 
means to think the death of God, especially since the idea of God traditionally 
grounds sovereign power and serves as its highest instantiation” (22).  In this way, 
Crockett reveals not only the importance of his undertaking but also the necessity 
of his method. It is important to note that, for Crockett, theology is not neces-
sarily limited to traditional understandings of theology, with its privileging of the 
transcendent and doctrine, but rather in the Tillichian sense of “ultimate concern” 
or, more specifically put, the “open ended discourse about value and meaning in 
an ultimate sense” (27). This distinction opens space for “secular theology,” as 
opposed to confessional theology, which limits theological discourse to churches 
and seminaries. Moreover, Crockett argues that the term “religion” is a modern 
construct of the West that is imposed on diverse phenomena and practices, and the 
act of identifying a “religion” or “religious practice”—which is often the business 
of the academy—is essentially a political activity. In this sense, the political and 
the religious “imply one another.” Religion is then the “parallax gap” between 
ideology and theology.  
A term borrowed from Slavoj Žižek, the “parallax” is synonymous with 
what Kant called the “transcendental illusion,” that is “the illusion of being able 
to use the same language for phenomena which are mutually untranslatable and 
can be grasped only in a kind of parallax view, constantly shifting perspective 
between two points between which no synthesis or mediation is possible.”  For 
Crockett’s purposes, religion can only be understood by examining two closely 
linked concepts that are inherent to religion, yet share no common ground and 
have no mediation or synthesis—theology and ideology.  Crockett explains that 
the ideological dimension of religion attends to political power, while its theologi-
cal dimension, at its best, is the sincere desire within religion to make good on its 
own existence.
Following this discussion of the parallax of religion, Crockett traces our 
modern conception of sovereign power from Thomas Hobbes to its intrinsic 
relation to theology and politics/ideology in Carl Schmitt. Sovereignty is com-
prised of an absolute unity, or, as Hobbes writes, “the multitude so united in one 
Person...” (45). Accordingly, the secularization of the sovereignty of God is made 
complete in investing of the monarch with “the soul of the commonwealth” mak-
ing “all of its members subjects to this power.” This leads Crockett to assert, “The 
sovereign power of God is intrinsically connected to the oneness of God” (46). 
Because classical sovereignty is constructed by opposing unity to multiplicity, 
Crockett seeks to overturn this oppressive paradigm with thinking of potential, 
multiplicity, and weakness. 
Turning from the political abuse of theology, Crockett targets the theologi-
cal blunder of conceiving a unified and transcendent God. For Crockett, this 
means conceiving of God apart from being as “event,” as becoming or “attractor,” 
as the deconstruction and dis-enclosure of Christianity, or as “impotentiality,” the 
power to refrain from acting and certainly beyond monotheism. Crockett frames 
the problem that the unified sovereign power of the nation-state appears to be 
god-like in the first place. Thus, with theopoetic and philosophical underpinnings, 
what is accomplished is a kind of transvaluation of our divine value conception—
not Being but event, not one but many, not transcendent but immanent, etc. In 
chapter three, Crockett continues to emphasize immanence via Spinoza by delving 
into what Delueze calls “the virtual.” Crockett quotes Delueze on the significance 
of Spinoza as being “no longer the affirmation of a single substance, but rather lay-
ing out of a common plane of immanence on which all bodies, all minds, and all 
individuals are situated” (66). On the one hand, a transcendent sovereign power 
was expected to actualize a possibility (which does not have being until the sover-
eign brings it into being). On the other hand, the plane of immanence (the “image 
of thought” which provides consistency for the creation of philosophical concepts) 
is understood as containing the virtual, which does not lack being; rather it resides 
within a thing or concept and merely waits to be differentiated.
Crockett, in chapter four, goes on to analyze the problem of liberalism 
framed by Carl Schmitt, imagining a future beyond liberalism that “takes mate-
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rial, worldly things seriously at the same time as it realizes the profound imbrica-
tion of religion and politics” (84). The outcome is certainly guilty of the Schmit-
tian critique of liberalism insofar as it does not favor the overt “friend-enemy 
distinction” Schmitt argues for in Political Theology. However, Crockett wishes to 
challenge liberalism on its most basic level: the market.
In support of the market, the secular emerges as an “emancipation from the-
ology” that works toward maximal human freedom, which in turn is “ultimately 
the freedom of the market” Not only is this divide superficial, but Crockett argues 
that it fails to fully appreciate the implications of psychoanalytic theory, which 
put into question our conscious allegiances to theological and political systems. 
Crockett states, “so long as theism and atheism remain questions of belief, they 
remain superficial compared to a psychoanalytic understanding of the unconscious 
and derivative of more primary human motivations and desires” (158). It can be, 
and often is, the case that what we say we believe is refuted both on a material and 
subconscious level. Hence, a “radical political theology” utilizes psychoanalysis 
to analyze the material conditions of our physical and psychic existence, and in 
stride brings religion back into the public sphere, not opposed to secularism, but 
wrapped up in it as a means of fighting the false ideal of secular human freedom 
which manifests in free market liberalism.
In the latter half of the book, Crockett gives an argument for thinking of a 
post-secular theology in terms of Catherine Malabou’s theory of “plasticity,” (Ch. 
5, 8), the Deleuzian event and our Biopolitical situation (Ch.6), and how Radical 
Theology can think through the “event” in terms of Deleuze alongside St. Paul 
(Ch.7). Among these, Malabou’s plasticity is especially pertinent as it allows Crock-
ett to bind together the various philosophies that have been discussed. In chapter 
five, Crockett leads us through the “anomalous” aspect of Spinoza’s thought that is 
not part of the modern liberal democratic state’s notion of democracy, that which 
Antonio Negri calls potentia or the “power of the multitude” (98). The passage 
from any kind of radical democracy as outlined by Spinoza to a Schmittian “state 
of exception” politics is explained via Spinoza’s radical immanent critique of reli-
gion in contrast with Schmitt’s theological conception of an omnipotent, transcen-
dent deity, a theology that is “secularized” in the form of the sovereign. 
To escape this, Crockett prescribes three concepts as articulated by fellow 
Continental thinkers: Malabou’s plasticity for “thinking of matter and form in the 
shadow of religious temporal Messianism,” “equality” i.e. “the power of anyone at 
all” rather than the “sovereign power of the majority” who dictate which issues are 
debated in the first place, and Foucault’s analysis of “governmentality” wherein the 
biopower of the state over human life is opposed. Plasticity becomes the “religious 
supplement” that is “not merely a supplement” because it is an inherent aspect of 
the “counter conduct opposing the predominant neoliberal and neoconservative 
forms of governmentality that capture or constrain life.” Thus, within the bounds 
of Crockett’s “secular theology,” which seeks to speak of the ultimate concern of 
the people and theology’s positive role within the parallax of religion, “plasticity 
and equality can be seen as contemporary theoretical forms of potentiality beyond 
liberalism” (107).
Deleuze and “the event” in chapters 6 and 7 allow Crockett to explain and 
speak of a “pure law” that is beyond what Giorgio Agamben calls “force-of-law,” 
that is “law without law,” i.e. our current political situation is constituted by a per-
petual state of exception in which what we call “law” is really a suspension of the 
law in which new laws are birthed (e.g. the Patriot Act, Gitmo, etc.). Crockett pos-
its Deleuze a “successor of Paul” because he provides us the tools to think of the 
event, which signals “the end of global capitalism because capitalism has reached 
its earthly limits of resources that make indefinite growth impossible” (144). We, 
like Paul, are looking for an event to proclaim on our own road to Damascus that 
reorients reality in contrast to the current power alignments and leads us out of 
the sovereign state of exception. If we are to utilize Deleuze, then we can think of 
such an event as a “futural possibility in the present,” when our “openness to the 
future” (143) unlocks the possible realities contained in the virtual reality of our 
plane of immanence.
Crockett’s last chapter continues thinking through immanence by returning 
to Catherine Malabou’s reading of Hegelian plasticity and recent developments 
in neuroscience. Plasticity, which Malabou reads in Hegel’s Phenomenology of the 
Spirit, allows Malabou to understand the Hegelian dialectic not as a play of simple 
opposites but as the “stretching and folding of forms of temporality and subjectiv-
ity rather than the stereotypical supercessionism that is criticized by postmodern 
theorists wary of its totalizing operation.” In terms of brain science, “Plasticity 
refers to the incredible resilience of form of adult brain cells,” (154) their ability 
to give, receive, and destroy form- a “branching off that is creative and not simply 
responsive or passive.” Following Henri Bergson, Crockett concludes that theology 
would remain “A machine for making gods,” however “these gods would be plastic 
gods, and the theological machine would be a brain” (2). Plasticity allows for shift-
ing religious philosophical discourse from the temporal to the spatial, for it has 
to do with interacting and creating on the spatial plane and realizing actualities, 
rather than operating on the temporal line of Christian Messianism or the Der-
ridian “to come.” Lastly, Crockett admires the concept of plasticity for it allows 
us to move beyond reading thinkers in “either/or terms,” rather allowing normally 
mutually exclusive thoughts to give and receive from one another because, ac-
cording to Crockett, “To truly interpret the world is to change it” (159). Plasticity 
allows for the construction of a truly radical political theology in its forming and 
receptivity to multiple streams of thought. This is indeed a timely claim that hope-
fully saves this project, no matter how brilliant, from a kind of formalism that is 
often an indictment of postmodern thought.
It is Crockett’s explicit refusal to engage with the work of liberation theol-
ogy- particularly black, womanist, and feminist theology- that ultimately limits 
his project. While he does not wish to dismiss “other forms of theological think-
ing,” nor deny liberation theology’s engagement in “important and vital political 
theology,” his theological concern bases much of its raison d’ être on a questionable 
observation made by Jeffrey W. Robbins that liberation theology “never went so 
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far as to put the established theology into question” (10-1) However, if the center 
of the established theological order is properly identified as a white phallocentric 
value system, then Robbins’ claim seems quite spurious, especially when consider-
ing some of liberation theology’s more explicit decentering gestures, e.g. black the-
ology’s assertion of the ontological blackness of God, feminist theology’s castration 
of the “divine phallus,” and womanism’s radical subjectivity.
Furthermore, Crockett’s sympathy for Robbins’ position is troubling, not for 
its theologically radical component that demands a freedom to think God without 
God, but for its lack of consideration of influential liberation theologians and their 
ideas. What is especially puzzling (in light of the absence of liberation theologians 
in a work of radical political theology) is Crockett’s simultaneous criticism of 
radical orthodoxy and process theology alongside his attending to their work and 
concepts, namely the work of Catherine Keller and John Milbank. One can only 
wonder how the liberation theologian’s eye to real bodies on the ground might 
have complemented this thoroughly theoretical project.
Nevertheless, Clayton Crockett has constructed a brilliant work of politi-
cal theology.  Its systematic and methodical arguments make abundantly clear 
the complex resources that are used to build a radical political theology beyond 
liberalism.  Thinkers from various academic disciplines would greatly benefit from 
Crockett’s insight and illuminations.  However, given the space that Crockett has 
opened up by uniting so many disparate concepts and thinkers, perhaps the most 
significant addition he has contributed to the academy is freedom, freedom to (re)
imagine religion, politics, and theology without traditional limits and constraints. 
Bo Eberle and George Schmidt
Union Theological Seminary
